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THE LABOR FORCE UNDER SHORT-RUN
CHANGES IN INCOME, EMPLOYMENT,
AND ARMED FORCES
"Labour is a commodity which cannot be increased and
diminished at pleasure."
DAVIDfflCAUWO, Principlesof
Political Economy and Taxation
Tms chapter and two occasional papers by the author 1reviewthe be-
havior of the labor force since 1939 in the United States, Great Britain,
Germany, and Canada. The more recent paper compares the labor
force at its wartime peak among these countries and uses annual data
to bring out how it was built up in the United States and Britain in
large relative amounts and in Canada in a small relative amount, and
its failure to rise at all in Germany; how it was demobilized in the
United States, Britain, and Canada at the war's end; and (briefly)
how it reacted in the United States and Canada to the conflict in Korea.
Its course in relation to mobilization in wartime and demobilization
is summarized in Chapter 1 of this volume. Here labor force is com-
pared with fluctuations in earnings and income, unemployment, and
military strength during the years of war and transition. The compari-
son—further tested by multiple correlation analysis of quarterly data
—yields no evidence that the labor force has responded systematically
and dependably to short-run changes in income and in the demand for
labor, or to moderate peacetime changes in the armed forces.
As a proportion of the working-age population, labor force is derived
from census reports which have provided quarterly averages of monthly
estimates in the United States since 1940, quarterly estimates in Canada
since late 1945, and annual (June) estimates in Great Britain since
1939. Basic infonnation for census estimates of employment, unemploy-
ment, and labor force in the United States during this period rests on
data obtained by enumerators in interviews with a random sample of
25,000 households located in 68 broadly representative areas through-
out the country.2 Every individual 14 years of age or over in each house-
The Labor Force in War and Transition: Four Countries, Occasional Paper 86,
1952, and The Labor Force in Wartime. America, Occasional Paper 14, 1944,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
2 grossnumber of households in the sample was 25,000 until May 1956.
Because of absences, vacancies, and other circumstances, the net number of
households actually interviewed was usually between 20,000 and 22,000. Begin-
ning with May 1956, the size of the sample was increased to about 35,000
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hold is classified as employed, unemployed, or not in the labor force,
in accordance with the answers—given by some "responsible" member
of the household—to a standard set of questions. The labor force figure
is obtained by adding the estimates based on the number of persons
reported to be employed and the number reported to be unemployed
but seeking jobs.3
Using these data from each household, the Bureau of the Census
computes the percentage of persons' in each sex-color-age group who
are employed, unemployed, or not in the labor force. National estimates
are then derived by applying these percentages to independent esti-
mates of the total civilian population by sex-color-age groups.4
Since estimates are based on a relatively small sample, there is a
possibility of sampling error. The errors, and the steps taken to measure
and minimize them, are presented in Supplementary Appendix I.
United States: Effect of Fluctuations in Armed Forces,
Unemployment, Earnings, and Income on Labor
Force Behavior in the Short Run
ARMED FORCES.
Until the armed forces began to expand, the labor force in this coun-
try remained stable in its relation to population (Chapter 12). Since
most of the influx into the labor force occurred in the years when re-
cruiting camps were jammed with inductees, it seems safe to infer that
it was brought about by the military draft. The immense levies drew
young men from schools into the armed forces and thus into the labor
force; reduced the number of men at home for whom women had to
keep house; deprived many households of their main breadwinners,
making it necessary for wives, sisters, and mothers to work; and created
a vacuum in the social life of women which millions of them filled by
taking defense jobs.
Although the flow of new workers into the labor force during World
War H kept close pace with the draft, the outflow began as early as the
spring of 1945, several months before the end of the war and a full
year before demobilization of the armed forces had neared completion.
interviewed households in 330 areas. (The number of sample areas had been in-
creased to 280 in January 1954.)
8Persons 14 and older who are reported to be neither working nor looking for
work are as not being in the labor force. Chapter 3 and Appendix E
discuss further the census' definitions of employed, unemployed, and labor force.
Chapter 3 also describes sampling methods more fully. Some examples of "looking
for work," which were provided with questionnaires used by enumerators, appear
in Chapter 10 under the heading, "Some Questions Concerning the Findings of
This Investigation."
'Appendix E of the Economic Report of the President, Jan. 28, 1954.
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The exodus of men 25—64 from the labor force had been completed in
late 1945, that of women and young people in mid-1946,
the. elderly in the fourth quarter of that year (Chart
strength was still two million at the end of 1946, though servicemen
were discharged rapidly, and did not reach the post-World
CHART20
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low of 1.2 million until the winter of 1948. It fluctuated moderately
between 1948 and mid-1950, making no apparent impression on the
behavior of the labor force (it declined slightly during the first half
of 1950 when the labor force also showed a mild general decrease).
It nearly reached peak expansion for the Korean operations—almost
tripling—in the 12 months after the start of hostilities; during the same
time, total labor force participation made most of its Korean expansion.
The armed forces then remained rather constant for over three years,
from mid-1951 through the third quarter of 1954, while the total labor
force first fluctuated slightly and then lost its Korean additions, with
its various subgroups moving diversely. In 1955, the services declined
about one-fifth while the labor force increased slightly more than it had
during the Korean conflict. A small amount of these labor force gains
were lost in the last half of 1956, while armed forces remained constant.
THE UNEMPLOYED.
There was a strong association between unemployment and growth
of the armed forces during World War II, and a significant but not so
strong association during the postwar period. As the Army, Navy, and
Air Force expanded in 1941, unemployment declined rapidly—about
six months after Pearl Harbor it was less than 4 per centof the labor
force and by mid-1943, less than 1 per cent. It was near this level
for 24 months, while the armed services continued to expand to a peak
of 12 million in early 1945. Then as millions of persons left both the
armed services and civilian jobs during the last half of 1945, unemploy-
ment began to rise, reaching almost 4 per cent by early 1946—the
end of the labor force contraction. Between early 1946 and late 1948
unemployment fell off a little while the labor force edged from 56.3
to 57.5 per cent of the working-age population. Participation of the
age-sex groups was diverse—remaining virtually unchanged for men
25—64 after the second quarter of 1946, dipping slightly for elderly
persons but showing no net rise or fall, expanding somewhat for young
people, and continuing its steady, long-run increase for females. Be-
tween late 1948 and 1949 unemployment doubled, but this did not
induce a significant change in the over-all participation rate, which,
though dipping slightly in early 1949 was almost the same at the end
of the year as it was at the end of 1948: approximately 57.5 per cent of
the population 14 and older. Nor was the rise of unemployment accom-
panied by signfficant or systematic changes in the participation rates
of the broad age groups. The rate for men 25—64 declined somewhat
and that for women 25—64 rose even more (though slightly so) than the
increase called for by the long-run upward trend in female participa-
The percentage regarded as "normal" in this study.
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tion. The rates for young and elderly persons remained approximately
unchanged. Between late 1949 and the eve of the Korean action in the
second quarter of 1950, unemployment declined substantially. At the
same time the labor force as a whole and all major age groups mani-
fested a decline in propensity in accordance with the additional worker
hypothesis, but in opposition to the hypothesis that improved employ-
ment opportunities bring more persons into the labor force. This was
the only instance in the period of systematic behavior of labor force in
possible reaction to unemployment change. On the whole the period
between early 1946 and the outbreak in Korea gave no real support
either to the theory that higher unemployment results in additional
workers or to the theory that it squeezes workers out of the labor force
by depriving them of job opportunities.
Six months before the Korean action, unemployment began a decline
which was to last, almost without interruption, for nearly four years—
from the last quarter of 1949 to the second quarter of 1953. At the start
of this decline before the Korean outbreak, the participation rates of
men 25—64 remained substantially unchanged and those of persons
14—24 and 65 and older, of women 25—64, and of all persons 14 and
older moved downward. As unemployment continued to fall from
the Korean outbreak to the end of 1951, the total labor force reversed
its movement, realizing almost all of its increase of the Korean episode;
participation of young people showed a sharp, brief upturn, then began
a long, general decline; that of women rose; and that of older people
levelled off, then again slipped down. Unemployment still decreased
gradually but steadily between the end of 1951 and the summer of
1953, as the participation of females moved generally upward and then
declined, that of young and old people moved steeply downward (ex-
cept for a temporary upturn in the first quarter of 1953), and that of
all persons 14 and older first fluctuated, then decreased throughout
1953.
After the trough of this nearly four-year decline, unemployment,
seasonally adjusted, rose moderately in the third and fourth quarters
of 1953 and sharply in the first quarter of 1954, while the participation
of the total labor force and that of young persons and women first de-
clined and then rose, and the participation of elderly persons first rose
and then declined. During most of 1954 unemployment rose somewhat
further as the participation of young persons and of the total labor
force decreased and that of women, men, and elderly persons remained
about stable.
The decrease in total labor force participation during 1954 brought
it down to about the same level as had prevailed during the two years
before the Korean conflict (when, however, unemployment had been,
first, appreciably lower, then appreciably higher, than in 1954).
206SHORT-RUN LABOR FORCE BEHAVIOR
In the first quarter of 1955 unemployment fell and was fairly constant
during the rest of that year and throughout 1956; except for men and
women, participation rose generally in 1955, failed to rise further dur-
ing the first half of 1956, and then declined in the last half. The par-
ticipation of men declined very gently during most of the two years
and that of women was generally upward until the last quarter of
1956. Thus, the association of labor force with unemployment during
these seven years followed no discernible pattern.
It may, of course, be argued that unemployment as a whole is not a
dependable indicator of employment opportunity. Such an argument
could proceed on two grounds.
Unemployment may fluctuate, not only from changes in employ-
ment, but also from changes in the labor force itself. This possibility
can, however, be tested against the behavior of a group which does not
enter and leave the labor force in any appreciable numbers, i.e. men
20 44. The test indicates that the unemployment of men 20—44 in this
period followed the same course, essentially, as that of total unemploy-
ment. Except that it remained constant for the most part during mid-
1951—1953 instead of gradually declining, and did not rise quite as
much as total unemployment in 1953—1954, its movement was very
similar.
But even this test may not be a good indicator of the effect of job
opportunity. For example, an abundance of jobs might conceivably
induce men 20—44 to alter their employment status if not their labor
force status, by leaving one office or factory to seek work in another,
thus increasing unemployment at a time, when jobs were actually more
plentiful. A better indicator might be the total hours worked, or over-
time hours paid for at premium rates. An examination of these and
other such factors would be most interesting, but they are beyond the
scope of this study. The writer does not believe that labor force par-
ticipation will respond any more sensitively or systematically to these
other possible indicators than it has to unemployment, but a rigorous
test must wait for some other investigation.
QUARTERLYINCOME.
Over the seventeen years from early 1940 through 1956, disposable
personal income per adult-male equivalent employed rose 162. per cent
—a 35 per cent rise after adjustment for the increase in the cost of
living. As estimated by the census from sample surveys, the 1956 labor
force was larger than that of 1940 by 3.3 per cent of population 14
and older, and as enumerated by the regular census in 1950, it was
about the same as it had been in the censuses of 1890 through 6
—whenthe unemployment rate was also about the same (although
CStandardizedfor age-sex and rural-urban composition.
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both money income and real income were much lower). The regular
census also revealed that participation in 1950 was above 1940. It is
possible that participation in 1950 or 1956 was higher than in 1940
because of the increase in armed forces and the decrease in unemploy-
ment in 1950 (Chapter 10). Changes in participation were associated
neither with trends in income nor with deviations of income from the
trends (which seemed to be a straight-line arithmetic movement
throughout the entire seventeen years). In constant prices income
seemed to move with labor force in only a few years—notably 1940—
1942 and late 1943 through early 1945 (Chart 21).
CHART21
Labor Force Compared with Disposable Income and Hourly Earnings,
United States, 1940—1956
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Allseries are quarterly averages of monthly estimates, except disposable income (quarterly
totals), and are seasonally adjusted.
Source and description of adjustments: Appendix Tables D-2, D-5, and B-2, and related text.
HOURLY EARNINGS.
Hourly earnings differ from quarterly income in that they. exclude
dividends, interest, and other non-wage receipts of wage earners, em-
ployers, and the self-employed. They cover earnings, approximately,
for time worked and are unrelated statistically to employment or un-
employment. And they are not adjusted here to an adult-male equiva-
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lent. Real hourly earnings rose about a fifth during 1940—1946, and
remained rather constant during 1946—1948. They went up nearly 10
per cent by early 1950, changed very little during 1950—1951, and then
climbed steadily during 1952—1956, so that by 1956 they were 30 per
cent above 1946, and more than 50 per cent above 1940. So far as
earnings were concerned, it was impossible to discern any influence
on total labor force participation during this period, whether they
expressed in money or in real terms. Participation rates of the individ-
ual groups were similarly lacking in systematic association. Participa-
tion of females, of course, moved generally upward, as real hourly earn-
ings rose over the seven-year period 1950—1956. The older and younger
groups showed some positive agreement with real hourly earnings in
certain detailed changes in participation rates during 1950—1956 but
not in others, and they both moved in opposite directions from earn-
ings during this period so far as trend was concerned.
Canada: Effect of Fluctwitions in Armed Forces,
Unemployment, Earnings, and Income on Labor
Force Behavior in the Short Run
ARMEDFORCES.
The crude annual data for 1939—1945 have suggested that in Canada
the labor force during World War II increased by about the same
amount in relation to armed forces as did the labor force in the
United States. The Canadian estimates which have been available for
every third month from late 1945 to the end of 1952, and thereafter
for every month, showed that the labor force had lost its wartime addi-
tions by the end of 1946, when demobilization of the armed forces was
nearly complete (Chart 22). During the next four years (to mid-1950)
the armed forces remained close to 4 or 5, and labor force participa-
tion between 534 and 548 per 1,000 population 14 and older. In view
of the fact that the sampling error of any figure was as much as 6, i.e.
±3 per 1,000 population 14 and older, these small variations scarcely
uphold the existence of outside influences (Table 43). During the
Korean conflict, Canadian armed services did not increase as much as
the American armed services but, like the latter, they did remain al-
most at Korean operation levels after the fighting had ended. Total
labor force participation, instead of rising as in the United States,
drifted downward and was about 1 per cent less during 1950—1952
than during 1946—1949. It declined further and by a similar amount
in 1953 and 1954, then rose in the last half of 1955. Except that it
held up slightly better in 1956 -and manifested no increase in early
•1954, total labor force participation in Canada during 1953-1956 be-
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haved rather similarly to that in the United States during these years.
But it showed less sign of association with armed forces.
UNEMPLOYMENT.
than in the United States
(Chart 22). There was some
One of the striking features of United States-Canadian comparisons has been
their agreement in movement of unemployment. .Unemploymentwas lower in
210
Young persons (14—24)
All persons 14 and older
Armed Forces and Unemployed

















(exceptarmed forces). Source and description of ad-
1945 '46'47'48'49'50'51'52'53'54'55'56
Unemployment in Canada remained lower7
throughout the decade ending in 1956SHORT-RUN LABOR FORCE BEHAVIOR
TABLE 43
Variation in the Proportion of the Labor Force to Population and
the Corresponding Range of Error in the Labor Force Sample
Estimates, United States and Canada, 1946—1952
(per 1,000 population of same sex and age)






. Mid-1950 Mid-1952 2(2ti)
United States . :
Labor force 14 and older 11 20 6
Males 14 andolder 14 13 14
Females 14 and older 24 35 10
Young people 14—24 25 37 20;
Men 25—64 13 14 20
Women 25—64 . 33 56 10
Elderly people 65 and older 11 31 20
Canada .
Labor force 14 and older 14 18 6
Males 14 and older 20 30 12
Females 14 and older 13 26 8
Young people 14—24 32 32 20
Men 25—64 21 21 20
Women 25—64 12 32 10
Elderly people 65 and older 37 60 20
Source of estimates of sampling variability: Current Population Reports; Series
P-57, No. 118, p. 12; The Labor Force, November 1945—March 1952, Reference
Paper No. 35, pp. 5—6. See also the author's comments in "Statistical Standards
and the Census," in the American Statistician, February 1952, and Supplementary
Appendix I.
fluctuation. Seasonally adjusted, it rose from about 2 per cent in 1948
to 3.8 per cent of the labor force in March 1950 and then declined to
below 2.5 per cent. But it rose to near United States levels (about 4.5
per cent) only once—in the 1954 recession. There was a similar tend-
ency for the labor force to rise in 1955 when unemployment decreased,
as if in response to improved job opportunity, but there was no such
association before and during the Korean operations..
The tendency of the total labor force participation to decline some-
what (instead of rising somewhat as in the United States) during the
years following World War II is reflected in the behavior of the major
age-sex groups. Men 25—64 showed a slight net rise, compared with a
average percentage in Canada, perhaps because of the great importance of agri-
culture. But the similarity of the detailed movements in the two countries during
1945—1950 was most impressive in 'view of the small samples on which the
unemployment estimates rest.
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slight net fall in the United States; but compared with this country
the participation of young and elderly persons decreased much more,
and that of women rose much less over the decade following 1946.
The rise of unemployment in the 1949—1950 recession was not reflected
in any significant rise or decline for any of these age-sex groups, and
the post-Korean rise of unemployment in 1954 was met by a similar
lack of systematic response. For most of this decade the participation
of elderly men and young persons continued the downward trend with-
out check or acceleration; that of women 25—64 continued its slow up-
ward trend, also without change of pace. However, the slight increases
in participation of all persons 14 and older, of young and old people,
and the small acceleration in the increase of participation of women,
which occurred in late 1955 and 1956, were associated with a mod-
erate decline of unemployment.
QUARTERLY INCOME AND EARNINGS.
Quarterly income and hourly earnings both soared in Canada during
1946—1956. Adjusted for the cost of living, hourly earnings rose about
a third and income about a half. A trffling upswing of real income
and earnings in early 1947 was accompanied by a very slight drop in
labor force participation of all groups; a dip in real income and earn-
ings during late 1947 and early 1948 was associated with a rise in the
participation of women and elderly persons, and with a gentle decline
in that of the young. On the whole, however, the labor force fluctua-
tions were too restrained and unsystematic to suggest any response
to changes in earnings or income of the kind that could be detected by
graphical comparison.
Great Britain
Since Britain's annual estimates of the labor force are derived basically
from registrations for social insurance rather than from surveys or
censuses of population, they are not likely to reflect ordinary changes
in labor force behavior, for a person is scarcely apt to withdraw his
registration if he leaves the labor force briefly. They should, however,
reflect the more long-lasting changes in his willingness or ability to
be gainfully occupied.
British wartime additions to the labor force had entirely disappeared
by mid-1946, about the same time as in the United States and about
six months earlier than in Canada. Thereafter, participation declined
from 60.6 per cent of the population 14 and older in 1946 to 58.8 per
cent in mid-1949 (Chart 23), perhaps partly because of the• small ad-
ditional separations from the armed forces, but during 1951—1956 it
climbed above the 1946 level and, in fact, to slightly above the level
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CHART23
Labor Force Compared with Armed Forces and the Unemployed,
Great Britain, 1939—1956
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of 1989. Through the eleven postwar years, unemployment remained at
very low levels—between 0.7 and 1.6 per cent of the labor force; and
from 1948 forward the armed forces were at nearly constant strength.
All in all, the British labor force participation was fairly stable—it was
the 'same in 1951 as it had been in 1931, and almost the same as in
1921 and 1911.8
Recapitulation
In the United States, Great Britain, and Canada wartime additions had
left the labor force by the end of 1946 and participation rates were
close to those in previous periods of peacetime high employment. Dur-
ing the decade 1947—1956, the over-all participation in these three coun-
tries remained rather impressively stable, within a maximum range of
1.8 per cent in Great Britain, 2.3 per cent in the United States and 2.6
per cent in Canada—smaller than the normal range of variation in the
United States or Canada between the winter and summer labor force
of any given
In the United States and Canada males continued to leave the labor
force as men above 45 retired earlier in life, and as boys and young
men extended their years of schooling. Women above 25, chiefly wives,
resumed their long-run labor force inflow in all three countries, though
at a very moderate rate in Canada. These offsetting changes did not
correspond in any consistent way to variations in armed forces, unem-
ployment, or hourly earnings and disposable income, even when earn-
ings and income were adjusted for changes in the cost of living.
The Joint and Several Effects of Armed Forces,
Unemployment, and Income or Earnings
When a number of elements are present in any behavior, the effect of
each may be so obscured by that of the others that it can be measured
only after all of the elements have been examined in various combina-
tions—by multiple and partial correlation.
Multiple correlations of United States data on labor force, armed
services, unemployment, earnings, and income were tested for two
8Standardizedfor age and sex composition.
In a study of the British labor market for 1920—1938 Gerhard Tintner suggests
that "it is not at all certain that there is any dependence of the supply of labor
on wages and prices." His materials and his use of the term "industrial labor
supply," indicate that he deals with shifts both into and out of the labor force and
between industrial and nonindustrial occupations within the labor force. His
measures therefore pertain to labor supply in relation to a group of important
industries, and not to all labor (see Appendix B). However, the stability of the
aggregate supply would be even greater than that of any segment of it. "An
Econometric Investigation of the British Labor Market," Econometricä,July1950,
p. 268.
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periods: the World War II period embracing the 26 quarters from
1940 through mid-1946, and the post-World War II period, covering
the 24 quarters from mid-1946. to mid-1952 (Table 44). Labor force
and unemployment were corrected for seasonal variations. (See text
of Appendix B and Tables B-i and B-2 for the seasonal indexes and
a discussion of the method of adjustment and its reliability.) Labor
TABLE 44
Labor Force Correlated with Armed Forces, the Unemployed,
Disposable Income, and Hourly Earnings, United States,
1940—1952
Both . .
Sexea Males FeinaJes Persona
14 & 14 14 &Persons 65
Older Older Older 14—24 Older
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS a
WorldWar II Period (1940—1946) b
Laborforce and:
Armed forcesr12+0.956 *0+0.880*0+0.968+0.9730*+0.92400





Real riO+0.399 0*+0.308+0.407 0*+0.439*0+0.4660*
Money —0.405 0*—0.266*—0.443°°+0.494*0—0.599









Money r17+0.384 •+0.773+0.137+0.304 *—0.381
MULTIPLE COBRELATIONS a
WorldWar H Period (1940—1946) b
Laborforce, armed
forces and:
UnemployedRi.230.956 '0.880 *00.968 0,974 **0.948
Real incomeR1240.964 000.904*00974*00.974*0093900
Moneyincome R1.25 0.961 0.889 0.971 0.977 0.948
Real hourly
earnings R1.260.961 0.893 0.972 °°0.975°°0.9240*
Moneyhourly
earnings R1.270.976 **0.9340*0.981 0.978 *00.926°'




14 G 14 14 Persons 65
Older Older Older 14—24 Older
MULTIPLE CORRELATIONS(cont.)





Moneyincome RL2850.963 0.8960*0.972 0.977*00.952
Real hourly
earnings R1.2360.962 000.894 0.973 0.976 0.949 °°
Moneyhourly
earnings R1.2370.980 0.937 0*0.982**0.981 0.948
Post-World War II Period (1946—1952) b
Laborforce,armed
forces and:
UnemployedR1.23 0.601 0.458 f 0.557 0.414 t 0.786
Real incomeR124 0.639 0*0.687000.454 0.459 t 0.760 0*
Moneyincome RL250.630 0.370 f 0.520 0.467 f 0.746°°
Realhourly
earnings R1.260.613 0.505 0.531 0.417 f0.751 °°
.Moneyhourly




Real incomeR1.2340.689 °°0.712*00.572f0.534 f 0.790 0*
Moneyincome R1.2350.633 0*0.46210.559 f 0.467 f0.814 00
Realhourly
earnings R1.2860.623 *00.514f 0.589 *00.426f 0.794
Money hourly
earnings R1.2370.789 *00.807°°0.688 0.616 0*0.789
PARTIALCORRELATIONS a






Real incomer12340.8380*0.628000.881 *00.876000.621 °°
Moneyincome r12.350.830 0.691 *00.8580*0.8720*0.629°°
Realhourly
earnings .'12.360.846 0.683 0.886 0.889 0.611
Moneyhourly
earnings r12.370.912 °°0.787*00.924*00.908000.59800TABLE 44, continued
Both
Males Females Persona
14 14 & 14 & Persons 65
Older Older Older 14—24 Older
PARTIAL COREFLATIONS(cont.)






Real incomer1324 —0.477 °°—0.3870—0.44600—0.40600—0.40800
Moneyincome p13.250.193 0.251 0 0.186 0.113 —0.275
Real hourly
earnings 113.26 —0.171 —0.076—0.150 —0.253 0—0.563°°
Moneyhourly
earnings rlS.27 —0.362 0—0.2290—0.292 *—0.3390—0.539°°






Real incomer12340.659 *00.2480 0.567000.4680*065300
Moneyincome r12.350.464 0.067 0.444 0.2190—0.440
Real hourly
earnings r12.380.471 0*0.274* 0.4000 0.283 0—0.46100
Moneyhourly






Real income 113.240.336 *—0.255 * 0.389 * 0.808 0 0.335*
Money incomer13.250.073—0.298 * 0.240 0 0.488 °°
Real hourly
earnings 113.260.138 —0.108 0.224 0.096 0.397 *
Money hourly
earnings 113.270.600 °°0.286 0.508 0.492 0*0.226 *





Real incomer1423 —0.594°° —0.562°° —0.58000 —0.406°°0.176
•Money in-
come 115.230.868 ° 0.363 * 0.385 0.358 ° 0.282 *
Real hourly
earnings116.23 —0.351 0—0.335 0—0.3890—0.296—0.101
Money hourly




14 14 14 Per8on8 65 G
Older Older Older 14—24 Older
PARTIAL CORRELATIONS' (cont.)





Real incomer1423 —0.384 *—0.613 —0.154—0.370 0 0.140
Money in-
come r15.23 —0.160 —0.069 —0.059 —0.237 ° 0.345°
Realhourly
earnings r18.230.076 —0.262 0 0.107 0.110 —0.191
Money hourly
earningsr17.230.623 0*0.748*00.374* 0.50200—0.117
SIMPLE INTERCORRELATIONS' BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Unemployed and:
Armed forces r32 —0.885 00 - —0.503*0
Realdisposable income r34 —0.707 *0 +0.207
Money disposable income r35 —0.471 00 —0.447
Real hourly earnings r36 —0.507 0* 0
Moneyhourly earnings r37 +0.606 —0.652 0*
Armedforces and:
Real disposable income rQ4 +0.539 '° —0.013
Money disposable income r25 +0.165 —0.245
Real hourly earnings r28 +0.504 +0.363
Money hourly earnings r27 —0.590 0* +0.234°
Sourceand explanation: Income and hourly earnings, Appendix P. Labor force,
armed forces, and unemployed, Appendix B. The variables are: labor force, X1;
armed forces, X2; unemployed, X3; real disposable income, X4; money disposable in-
come, X5; real hourly earnings, X6; money hourly earnings, XT.
*Significanton the 68 per cent (±o') level.
**Significanton the 95 per cent (±2i) level.
t Significant on the 75 per cent level.
'The labor force, armed forces, unemployed, and hourly earnings are quarterly
averages of monthly estimates. Disposable income (per adult-male equivalent em-
ployed) was computed in three-month aggregates. Income and earnings were ad-
justed for linear arithmetic trend. All were adjusted where necessary for seasonal
variation. Labor force, the armed forces, and the unemployed are expressed per
1,000 population aged 14 and older.
bTheWorld War II period is from the first quarter of 1940 through the second
quarter of 1946; the post-World War II period is from the third quarter of 1946
through the second quarter of 1952.
force, unemployment, and armed forces were expressed per 1,000
population 14 and Older, to eliminate any trend introduced purely by
rise in population. Disposable income was computed in three-month
aggregates, and hourly earnings in three-month averages. Each was
analyzed both with, and without adjustment for changes in the cost
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of living and for the straight-line arithmetic upward trend that seems
to be observable in income and earnings.9 There was no apparent
over-all trend during 1940—1952 in the participation of either the total
population or of males 14 and older. But there was an apparent straight-
line upward trend in that of females 14 and older, and a straight-line
downward trend in that of persons 14—24 and 65 and older. The cor-
relations were constructed between the deviations from these trends.
In all cases, the trends were derived from the entire 1940—1952 episode.
Table 44 seems to show that during the World War II period labor
force participation was very strongly (and positively) correlated with
armed forces—only for males 14 and older was this simple correlation
below 0.900 (and very little below at that). And for three of the five
labor force groups it was above 0.950. All of these correlations were
significant well above the 95 per cent level. The correlation of labor
force with unemployment was in all cases lower than it was with
armed forces, but not much lower. This association was to be expected
—as was the fact that it was uniformly negative—in view of another cir-
cumstance, to be noted. in Table 44 under the heading of "Simple Inter-
correlations between Independent Variables," that there was also a
high and negative intercorrelation between armed forces and unem-
ployment (r32 = —0.885). The three-cornered relationship raises a
difficult question—to be asked whenever the so-called independent
variables are not truly independent of one another. If labor force
participation moved with armed forces, and if unemployment moved
away from both, which of the three was the prime mover?
We are aided in answering this question by certain theoretical con-
sideratioñs. One is that the size of the armed forces was surely set al-
most entirely by the needs of the war and was therefore an independent
variable, determined little or not at all by the levels of labor force
participation and unemployment.'0 Another is that the other variables
could not be regarded as independent of armed forces. Large scale
mobilization could have the theoretical effects of (1) drawing young
students into the armed forces and therefore into the labor force; (2)
reducing the size of families, thus enabling adult females to move from
unpaid housework into employment; and (3) reducing unemployment,
by recruiting idle persons or by increasing the number of civilian jobs.
adjustment to upward trend was made to allow for the possibility that peo-
ple become accustomed to a certain rate of rise in income and react only when the
rise is specially slow or rapid.
10Therewas some chance that if labor force participation had been lower and
unemployment higher, the government might have had to scale down armed force
mobilization during World War II; but there is little evidence of such a contin-
gency. It is more likely that the same anned. strength could have been levied in
any case, with lower labor force participation or higher unemployment resulting
in less civilian production.
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In support of these theoretical considerations, the multiple correla-
tions of labor force with armed forces and unemployment (R1.23) were
the same or scarcely larger than the simple correlations with arme4
forces alone (?,2).Butall of these multiple correlations were substan-
tially larger than the simple correlations with unemployment alone
(ri3).'1 And only for persons 65 and older, was the multiple correla-
tion of labor force and armed forces with unemployment larger than
that with income or with earnings.12 Although the simple associations
of labor force with income or earnings were much weaker than those
with unemployment, they were less dependent on the changes in armed
forces, as shown by the simple intercorrelations in Table 44.
None of the simple correlations of labor force with income or earn-
ings was very high, but more than half of them were significant on the
95 per cent level, and the remainder of them were significant on the 68
per cent level. Do these simple correlations demonstrate that income
or earnings have influenced the short-run changes in labor force par-
ticipation? Not necessarily, for both could have been influenced by
a third factor_especially changes in armed forces.'3 Any. such influence
might be determined by two methods—multiple, and partial correla-
tion.
Multiple correlation tests the effect on the size of the coefficient by
adding a variable. Thus real income was added to the simple correla-
tion between labor force participation and armed forces (with ?12be-
coming R,.24) and to the multiple correlation of labor force with armed
forces and the unemployed (with R1.23 becoming R,.234). Then money
income, real hourly earnings, and money hourly earnings were substi-
tuted alternately for real income. None of the three-variable multiple
correlations was substantially greater than the two-variable multiple
correlations involving armed forces and unemployment, or than the
simple correlation with armed forces. Yet they were very much greater
than the simple correlations of labor force with income or earnings
alone. This method suggests that income and earnings are not dominant
in the explanation of labor force behavior during 1940—1948.
Partial correlation was used to see what the associations of labor
force with income and earnings would have been if the other factors
had not fluctuated. A first set indicates that the participation of various
"Forpersons 65 and older the difference was least substantial. This was also
the only labor force group for which the simple correlation with unemployment
was in excess of —0.900.
Inspite of the fact that the simple correlations of labor force with unemploy-
ment were much larger than the simple correlations with income or earnings.
And the economic developments that occur with changes in the size of the
armed forces.
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age-sex groups was rather strongly associated with armed forces,
ing unemployment and income, and unemployment and earnings con-
stant. The correlations were all positive and significant on the 95 per
cent level. A second set indicates that participation had a much weaker
association with unemployment, holding armed forces and income or
earnings ôonstant. Some of the correlations in the second set were
significant on the 95 per cent level, but most of them were significant
on the 68 per cent level or not at all. And nearly all were A
third set shows participation to be only moderately correlated with
income or earnings, holding armed forces and unemployment constant.
The partial correlations of labor force with real income except for per-
Sons 65 and older14weresignificant on the 95 per cent level and were
inverse. Partial correlations of labor force with money hourly earnings
were similarly significant, though positive, for all groups except per-
Sons 65 and older.
These uneven and moderate partial associations of the second and
third sets may reflect some independent influence of unemployment,
real income, and money hourly earnings on labor force participation,
but the case is not a strong or a consistent one. All the above correlations
—simple, multiple, and partial—make a clear case, however, for a close
association between labor force and armed forces during the wartime
period.
Nearly all of the correlations were much smaller during the postwar
period. The simple correlations with armed forces were significant
on the 68 per cent level for the participation of males 14 and older and
young persons 14—24. For that of both sexes 14 and older, females 14
and older, and elderly persons, they were significant on the 95 per cent
level, but only for the last group was the correlation at all high or
negative. That it was negative, instead of positive as it had been dur-
ing the war period, undermines its significance, since theoretical rea-
Sons are lacking for the participation of elderly persons to decline be-
cause armed forces rise, or to rise because armed forces decline. This
perverse behavior in the postwar period extends also to the relation
with unemployment—in this case the participation of the elderly
seemed to rise and fail with unemployment 15—though this behavior
may have occurred as the result of incomplete elimination of trend. Of
the other groups only for males 14 and older was the simple correla-
tion of participation with unemployment significant in the postwar
period.
The simple correlations of labor force with income or earnings were
14Thus possibly corroborating the moment-of-time results of this study.
Thus seemingly supporting the additional worker theory.
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for the most part substantially weaker than the simple correlations
with arnied forces.16 Indeed, the signs of the postwar correlations—
significant or insignificant—showed little agreement either from one
group to another or within the same group, from wartime to the post-
war period. Such evidence does not make it easy to claim a dependable
association between labor force participation and income or earnings
in either period.
When the various potential influences on postwar participation are
added to form multiple correlations of various combinations (R1.23
R1.237) the results are all significant on the 95 or 75 per cent
level. In the case of both sexes combined and for elderly persons, the
multiple correlations were all significant on the 95 per cent level and
were all much higher than the simple correlations with employment,
income, or earnings. However, they were very little higher than the
simple correlations with armed forces—suggesting that for these two
groups other factors add little to the explanation, and that armed
forces again wield the principal influence on participation. For males,
and females taken separately, and young persons, the multiple correla-
tions with armed forces, unemployment, and income or earnings were
generally substantially higher than the simple correlations with armed
forces alone, or than the simple correlation with any other single fac-
tor. For these groups no single factor would seem to offer an explana-
tion of labor force behavior. It is possible that all the factors may corn-
bine to offer one—but none of the multiple correlations for these three
groups was Yery high.
The conclusion that only armed forces adds much to the explanation
of the postwar labor force behavior of both sexes and elderly persons
is also upheld by the partial correlations. Holding unemployment and
income or earnings theoretically constant, e.g.r12•34through
laborforce participation is correlated with armed forces on the 95 per
cent level, though again we have the puzzling inverse association for
elderly persons with a positive one for all other groups. Most of the.
partial correlations with unemployment, holding armed forces and in-
come or earnings constant, e.g. through ?13.27,orwith income
or earnings, holding armed forces and unemployed constant, e.g. r14•23
through are only moderately significant or are not significant at
all.
The three groups—males, females, and young persons—showed
partial correlations which again reveal no clear dominance of any fac-
160f 20 simple correlations of labor force participation of the five groups with
money and real income on the one hand, and with earnings on the other, seven
were not significant at all and eleven were on the 68 per cent level, leaving only
three significant on the 95 per cent level. Two of the three were for males 14 and
older and had signs in reverse of those during the war.
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tor. The great majority were significant on only the 68 per cent level,
and those with unemployment and income or earnings frequently dif-
fered in sign from the war period. Of the few that were significant on
the 95 per cent level, about half were with armed forces, holding un-
employment and income or earnings constant, and nearly all were
modest compared to those during the war. Perhaps the chief exception
was the partial correlation with money hourly earnings, holding armed
forces and unemployment constant.
How can we explain this general weakness of the postwar association
of labor force participation with the various factors that seemed more
influential during the war—specially that with the armed forces?
One reason may be that the powerful patriotic and other moral re-
inforcements that accompany all-out mobilization were missing during
peacetime and during the limited military Operation in Korea. Perhaps
an equally important explanation is that the census estimates of labor
force were subject to sampling errors which, though minor in propor-
tion to the great movements in World War II, were large compared
with the moderate changes of 1946—1952. A range of 6 persons per
1,000 aged 14 and older resulting from sampling error is appreciable
if it is compared with fluctuations of 20, and the sampling varia-
bilities are even more sizable, relatively, among individual groups
(Table 43). The estimate of unemployment might vary from the sam-
pling error within a range of 2 per 1,000 population. Still greater varia-
tions in the labor force and unemployment data could occur because
of differences in the care exercised by census enumerators.
Incidentally, all correlations became much feebler when the labor
force was given a lag of one year behind the independent variables.'7
We might now consider briefly the rather interesting suggestion of
Sumner Slichter that the effect of a wage increase on labor supply
would depend on the level of earnings previously established.18 For
example, there is the possibility that more labor would be iorthcoming
at $7 a day if the prevailing wage had been $5 than if it had been $6,
presumably because the lower the level from which a given increase
starts, the greater is the relative change. This hypothesis was tested
for the United States by correlating, separately for 1940-1946 and
1946—1952, the changes in the size of the labor force per 1,000 popula-
tion 14 and older, with the percentage changes in real and money in-
17Thelabor force beginning with thethirdquarter of 1946, was correlated
with armed forces, the unemployed, and real income in the same period of 1945.
The multiple correlation dropped from 0.689 to 0.539, and the simple correlation
with armed forces both declined and changed sign from +0.589 (Table 43) to
—0.530. The associations with unemployed and real income became even more
insignificant than before.
18Modern Economic Society, HoIt, 1928, pp. 625—626.
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come and earnings, which were computed by dividing the income or
earnings of each quarter by those of the preceding quarter. The
relations thus obtained, however, had even less significance than those
derived by associating the labor force with income or earnings ex-
pressed. as percentages of the straight-line upward trend. The effect
suggested by Slichter might conceivably be found in the behavior of
the labor supply of a locality or of an individual firm, or in the behavior
of unions in collective bargaining, but it has no apparent bearing on
variations in labor force participation in the aggregate.
The foregoing discussion of factors influencing labor force has been
limited to the United States. No correlations were computed for the
British data, which covered only one month (June) each year.
For Canada we examine the participation of three groups 14 and
older—both sexes combined and males and females separately (Table
45). The simple association with armed forces was found to be signifi-
TABLE 45
Labor Force Correlated with Armed Forces, the Unemployed,
Disposable Income, and Hourly Earnings, Canada,
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Labor force and armed forces,hold-
irig constant unemployed and:
Real income "12.34+0.327 0+0.033+0.380 0
Moneyincome "12.35+0.349 *+0.074+0.380 0
Realhourly, earnings r12.38+0.344 *+0.078+0.377 0
Moneyhourly earnings r12.37+0.316 *+0.020 0
Laborforce and unemployed, hold-
ing constant armed forces and:
Real income "1324+0.096+0.103+0.013
Money income "13.25+0.131+0.190—0.078
Real hourly earnings "13.26+0.108+0.126+0.007






Real hourly earnings "16.23—0.024—0.173+0.208
Money hourly earnings r17.23+0.240 °+0.2560
SIMPLEINTERCORRELATIONS' BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Unemployed and:
Armed forces "32 +0.195
Real disposable income "34 —0.108
Money disposable income r35 0.573 *
Realhourly earnings r36 +0.066
Money hourly earnings r37 —0.441 *0
Armedforces and:
Real disposable income r24 —0.159
Money disposable income "25 —0.177
Real hourly earnings "26 +0.109
Money hourly earnings "27 +0.053
Source and explanation: Income and hourly earnings, Appendix D. Labor force,
armed forces, and unemployed, Appendix B. The variables are: labor force, X1;
armed forces, unemployed, X3; real disposable income, X4; money disposable
income, X5; real hourly earnings, Xe; money hourly earnings, X7.
*Significanton the 68 per cent (±o) level.
**Significanton the 95 per cent (±2u) level.
t Significant on the 75 per cent level.
The labor force, armed forces, and unemployed are estimates for quarterly
dates. Hourly earnings are quarterly averages of monthly data. Disposable income
(per adult-male equivalent employed) is a quarterly total. All are adjusted where
necessary for seasonal variations. Income and earnings are adjusted for linear
arithmetic trend. Labor force, the armed forces, and the unemployed are expressed
per 1,000 population aged 14 and older.SHORT-RUN LABOR FORCE BEHAVIOR
cant on the 95 per cent level for females, and on the 68 per cent
level for both sexes; for males it was not significant. It was positive
for all three groups. The correlation with real income was inverse for
males on the 68 per cent level, and that with real hourly earnings was
positive on the 68 per cent level for females. All other simple correla-
tions were insignificant. Again, unemployment and income or earnings
seemed to add little or nothing to the explanation of labor force be-
havior and the same can be said of the multiple and partial correla-
tions. Only a few of the correlations revealed any significance, except
where armed forces were involved, and even then they were on the
lower levels. There were partial correlations with armed forces, hold-
ing unemployment and income or earnings constant, but these were
significant only for both sexes and for females on the 68 per cent level.
Thus the associations between participation and all the factors—even
armed forces—were weaker. in Canada than in the United States dur-
ing the post-World War II years between 1946 and 1952. As in the
United States, they were still weaker when the labor force was given
a lag of one year to reveal the possible effect of changes in these
variables.
Differences in Earnings and Attractiveness of
Jobs among industries
It is possible that average earnings would be raised statistically by the
mere transfer of workers from low-paying agriculture and domestic
service to high-paying manufacturing and trade, even if no wage rate
had changed in any occupation or industry. A comparison of earnings
weighted by the industrial distribution of employment prevailing at
the time, with earnings weighted by the distribution at a fixed date,
reveals that shifts in the composition of employment in industry had
little effect on the amount or behavior of earnings in both the United
States and Canada (Appendix Tables D-2 and D-3). Of course this
does not mean that industrial composition has had no influence on
the labor force. Any such influence depends also on the difference in
attractiveness or irksomeness between the old and the new jobs. If
both jobs were equally attractive to the worker or prospective worker,
any transfer from lower to higher paid employments would presum-
ably mean an increase in the effective reward per unit of effort, and
would require no distinction from, a rise in pay within each occupa-
tion. It would therefore require no standardization.
But if the new jobs at higher average pay. merely compensated for
the greater strain or longer travel involved, they would offer no better
rewards, and it would be necessary to standardize the earnings for the.
changes in industrial composition.
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Finally, if the industries whose employments were expanding were
relatively more remunerative and more agreeable, standardization
would eliminate the effect of 'a rise in average earnings but not the ef-
fect of betterment in average working conditions. Some persons might
withdraw from the labor force because of the higher income resulting
from the shift in employment composition; others might enter the labor
force at the same time because the work was, on the average, more
agreeable as a result of the shift. There is no way of dealing with this
difficulty, and over the decades it could conceivably involve substantial
numbers of workers. Within the years sEudied in this chapter, however,
the changes in the peacetime industrial composition of employment
would not suggest any significant net change in the attractiveness of
jobs, in view of the minor changes in average earnings that have been
found to result from these changes.
Labor Force Turnover
It would be possible for the net labor force participation to change
very little and yet for the gross composition to change a great deal.
In every household there occur endless reversals of plans, as girls leave
gainful employment to marry, grandfathers enter retirement, husbands
become disabled, high school graduates look for their first jobs, or
divorced women seek a means of self-support (Chart 24). During
1948—1952 in the United States—the only period during which such
data for the whole labor force have been available—the labor force
lost and gained, on the average, around 4.5 per cent monthly and 10
per cent yearly. Annual turnover seems to be only double, instead of
twelve times the monthly turnover, because many of the same persons
enter and leave the labor, force several times a year. It is not known
how much of this turnover is real and how much is the result of errors
in the answers of householders to the census enumerators' questions
in different months or years.
Have these gross changes been influenced by the level of unemploy-
ment or incomes? The brief experience reveals that turnover has varied
seasonally. It quickened in the spring as crops were planted and stu-
dents left school and went to work or young women resigned their
jobs to marry. It sped up in the summer as young people switched
from one temporary employer to another and as crops were harvested
in different months in different regions. It stayed fairly high in. Septem-
ber because the students returned to school. And it finally dropped
to a low in late fall and winter (perking up very little during the so-
called Christmas rush). The range of the gross change was between
4 per cent in winter and 6 per cent in summer. The average was ap-
proximately 10 per cent a month for females and 2.5 per cent for males.
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CHART24
Gross Changes in Civilian Labor Force Compared with the Unemployed,
Disposable Income, and Armed Forces: United states; 1948—1953
Average Number Entering and Leaving Civilian Labor Force,
and Number Unemployed, per 1,000 CivIlian Labor Force
14 and Older in Same Sex Group
-.
— -




I I I I
— Armed forces per 1.000 population
• 14 and older
Ratioscales
I I I
1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953
AU series arequarterlyaverages of monthly estimates, except disposable income (quarterly
totals). Source: Appendix Tables B-i (labor force by employment, and armed forces) and
D-5 (income); and CurrentPopulation Reporte,Bureau of the Census, Series P-50, P-59.
Until mid-1950 when the mobilization of armed force brought on addi-
tional turnover, the proportion of population 14 and older who entered
or left the labor force in any month was not influenced, apparently,
by the levels of income and The gross change continued
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7.5 per cent.19 During the last half of 1950 and early 1951, a small
rise in civilian turnover seemed to be clearly associated with the in-
crease of anned forces, as young men shifted out of jobs into the
services and women and girls left school or housework to seek employ-
ment; but civilian turnover declined and then remained stable during
the rest of 1951, while armed forces were rising and unemployment
was still falling.
19This is also consistent with the conclusion of Mr. W. Lee Hansen of The
Johns Hopkins University. Mr. Hansen has analyzed with some degree of intensity
the data on gross additions to, and reductions from unemployment for 1948
through early 1956. He concludes that: "The absolute difference in gross move-
ments during periods of high and low unemployment is due almost wholly to
movement from the unemployed to a job or vice versa, rather than to differential
movements into and out of the labor force.... Anexamination of gross move-
ments in unemployment [in and out of the labor force] reveals no signfficant
changes in the levels or their composition other than what might be expected
because of seasonal variations." Short-Run Behavior of the Labor Force: An
Analof "Gross Change" Data, mimeographed, Feb. 13, 1957, p. 19.
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